"Compensations and contributions under an international carbon treaty" by Kenneth A. Lewis & Laurence S. Seidman
  0 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES* 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
ALFRED LERNER COLLEGE OF BUSINESS & ECONOMICS 
UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE 
 
WORKING PAPER NO. 2008-03 
 
COMPENSATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS  
UNDER AN INTERNATIONAL CARBON TREATY 
 














.© 2007 by author(s). All rights reserved. 
 
 
   1 
COMPENSATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS  
UNDER AN INTERNATIONAL CARBON TREATY 
 
Laurence Seidman 
Chaplin Tyler Professor of Economics 




Chaplin Tyler Professor of Economics 




Keyword: International Carbon Treaty 
  ABSTRACT 
 
The simulations in this paper use actual 2004 data on carbon emissions and per 
capita GDP from 178 countries to provide a rough estimate of how much better off high-
income countries might be by compensating low-income countries to help reduce carbon 
emissions rather than doing it without their help; and a rough estimate of the per capita 
compensation to each low-income country and the per capita contribution from each 
high-income country under several alternative formulas that might be adopted under an 
international carbon treaty.  The study focuses special attention on the per capita 
compensations to India, China, and Russia, and the per capita contributions from the 
United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, and France, under alternative 
formulas.  In our initial simulation, if the 46 countries with per capita GDP above 
$12,000 want to reduce world emissions by 1.095 billion metric tons (15% of world 
emissions), we calculate that the total cost of their emissions reduction would be $108 
billion if they do it without help.  But if they get optimal help from the 132 low-income 
countries, the total cost of reducing world emissions 1.095 billion would be only $55 
billion-- $27 billion for the low-income countries and $28 billion for the high-income 
countries-- so the world cost saving would be $53 billion and the cost saving for the high-
income countries would be $80 billion.  Thus, if the high-income countries compensate 
the low-income countries 100% of their cost ($27 billion), the high-income countries 
would still be $53 billion better off than if they had done it alone.  Under the formula 
used in this initial simulation, China’s per capita compensation would be $7 and the 
U.S.’s per capita contribution would be $40.   2 
Introduction 
 
The simulations in this paper use actual 2004 data on carbon emissions and per 
capita GDP from 178 countries to provide a rough estimate of how much better off high-
income countries might be by compensating low-income countries to help reduce carbon 
emissions rather than doing it without their help; and a rough estimate of the per capita 
compensation to each low-income country and the per capita contribution from each 
high-income country under several alternative formulas that might be adopted under an 
international carbon treaty.  The study focuses special attention on the per capita 
compensations to India, China, and Russia, and the per capita contributions from the 
United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, and France, under alternative 
formulas.     
The importance of obtaining broad international participation in reducing carbon 
emissions is widely recognized (Frankel 2007; Olmstead and Stavins 2006; Pizer 2006; 
Zhang 2004; Aldy, Barrett, and Stavins 2003; Barrett and Stavins 2003; Weyant 1999).  
This study investigates the quantitative aspect of one method of engaging the 
participation of low-income countries: compensation.   
The study considers two ways to reduce emissions under the treaty: a harmonized 
carbon tax or an international permit market (a comparison of the efficiency of a carbon 
tax, carbon permits, and a hybrid, given uncertainty about compliance costs, is provided 
by Pizer 2002).  In theory each way would equalize the carbon price facing all emitters 
and minimize the world cost of achieving a given world emissions reduction target.  
Throughout this paper, whenever we report per capita compensations to low-income   3 
countries or per capita contributions from high-income countries, it should be understood 
that these compensations and contributions can be implemented either explicitly with the 
tax method or implicitly with the permit method.  In this paper we call the administrator 
of the treaty the “Treaty Board.”  We will not discuss political and administrative aspects 
of the treaty and the Treaty Board (for example, whether the Treaty Board would be a 
newly formed agency or a division of a current international agency, how many votes 
each country would have, and so on).  
If emissions are reduced through a harmonized carbon tax (Nordhaus 2006; 
Cooper 2000; Cooper 1998; analysis of the design of a carbon tax within each country is 
given by Goulder 1992, and Poterba 1991), compensations would be implemented 
directly through a formula that prescribes the contribution from each high-income 
country government and the compensation to each low-income country government.  
Under the carbon tax treaty, each country that signs the treaty would agree to levy a 
carbon tax at the uniform magnitude specified by the Treaty Board for all countries (for 
example, $100 per ton); each country government would levy and administer its carbon 
tax, collect and keep its carbon tax revenue, and decide how to use the revenue.  High-
income country governments would make contributions to the Treaty Board and the 
Treaty Board would use this revenue to make compensation payments to low-income 
country governments.  Each high-income country government would decide how to 
finance its contribution to the Treaty Board.  Each low-income country government 
would decide how to use its compensation from the Treaty Board. 
If emissions are reduced through marketable permits (either domestic or 
international permit plans are analyzed in Olmstead and Stavins 2006; Bradford 2004;   4 
McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002;), compensations and contributions would be implemented 
indirectly by a formula used by the Treaty Board to distribute permits to countries under 
the treaty.  Low-income countries would be given more permits than they are expected to 
use so they would become net sellers of permits and receive compensation through their 
net sales.  High-income countries would be given less permits than they are expected to 
use so they would become net buyers of permits and would make a contribution through 
their net purchases.  Each country government could sell all its permits, collect and keep 
its carbon permit revenue, and decide how to use the revenue; or each country 
government could distribute some or all of its permits for free to its own firms. 
The cost to an economy from emissions reduction is due to the cutback in carbon 
products and in products made using carbon, the shift in the mix of the products from 
high-carbon-using products to low-carbon-using products, and shifts to costlier 
production processes that use less carbon.  Any tax or permit price paid to a government 
is not a cost to the economy but is rather a transfer from the private sector to the 
government.  We assume the government would use this transfer to finance benefits to its 
own citizens—by either cutting other taxes, or paying cash to individuals or firms, or 
providing government programs. 
This study investigates the quantitative consequences of the following strategy for 
high-income countries concerning carbon emissions: Compensate low-income countries 
through an international carbon treaty to induce them to help reduce carbon emissions.   
The strategy is based on the intuition that it might be more costly for high-income 
countries to reduce emissions without help than it would be to compensate low-income 
countries to help.  If so, it might be in the self-interest of high-income countries to sign an   5 
international carbon treaty that implements compensation to low-income countries in 
return for their participation in reducing carbon emissions.  This study examines the 
quantitative impacts of such a treaty. 
Within high-income countries, it is widely agreed that it is very important to get 
low-income countries like China and India to help reduce carbon emissions.  But it is not 
widely agreed that it would be worth compensating them under an international treaty to 
help.  Within high-income countries, such compensation is often viewed as altruism.  
This study explores the possibility that, on the contrary, such compensation might be in 
the self-interest of high-income countries and provides estimates of how much each high-
income country would need to contribute and how much better off it would still be 
despite its contribution.    
In this study, each low-income country’s per capita compensation depends on its 
per capita GDP and its cost of emission reduction, and each high-income country’s per 
capita contribution depends on its per capita GDP and/or the cost-saving it achieves from 
the participation of low-income countries in emission reduction.  This study does not 
attempt to vary a country’s per capita compensation or contribution with an estimate of 
the per capita future benefit it might receive from cutting carbon emissions today.  It 
would be difficult to provide estimates of per capita future benefits for individual 
countries and to get diplomats to accept such estimates, but the feasibility of adjusting 
compensations and contributions with estimated future benefits might be pursued in 
further research (benefits as well as costs are weighed in Nordhaus 2007, and Lewis and 
Seidman 1996).   
       6 
Compensations and Contributions: An Overview 
 
  The IMF World Economic Outlook database (2004) contains 178 countries and 
provides per capita GDP for each country.  According to the Energy Information 
Administration (2004) of the U.S. Department of Energy, emissions for these 178 
countries in 2004 were 7.302 billion metric tons of carbon.  These 178 countries 
generated 99% of world emissions so we will refer to their emissions as “world 
emissions.”  Because the most recent data from EIA for these 178 countries is for 2004,
1 
we use 2004 in our study.  We use $12,000 as the per capita GDP dividing point for the 
countries.  The 46 countries  with per capita GDP greater than $12,000 (these include the 
United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and France) contributed 
roughly half (3.689 billion tons) of world emissions while the 132 countries with per 
capita GDP less than $12,000 (these include Russia, China, and India) contributed 
roughly half (3.612 billion tons).   
We will now give an overview of our numerical results for the year 2004 which 
are based on assumptions that will be discussed below.
2  Suppose the 46 countries with 
per capita GDP above $12,000 want to reduce world emissions 15% or 1.095 billion tons 
of carbon (from 7.302 billion to 6.207 billion).  If they cut their own emissions 1.095 
billion (29.7% of their own emissions of 3.689 billion) and therefore emit 2.594 billion 
tons, then the total cost of their emissions reduction would be $108.382 billion as shown 
in row 1 of Table 1 and a price of $198 per ton of carbon would be needed to induce this 
cut; with the other 132 countries not participating, the world cost of reduction is also 
                                                 
1 According to correspondence with Perry Lindstrom of the EIA, after 2004 the EIA switched to publishing 
regional rather than country data. 
2 Numbers are rounded off so there are slight discrepancies between the arithmetic in the text and Table 1.    7 
$108.382 billion.  But if the 46 high-income countries get optimal help from the 132 low-
income countries, the high-income countries would cutback only 0.553 billion and 
therefore emit 3.136 billion tons and the low-income countries would cutback 0.542 
billion and therefore emit 3.070 billion tons.   
Then the total cost of reducing emissions 1.095 billion with all 178 countries 
participating would be only $54.763 billion as shown in row 2 of Table 1 and a price of 
only $100 would be needed to induce it; the cost of emissions reduction to the low-
income countries would be $27.093 billion, and the cost of reduction to the high-income 
countries would be $27.670 billion (so $27.093+ $27.670=$54.763).  The world cost 
saving from expanding participation from 46 to 178 countries would be $53.618 billion 
($108.382-$54.763) as shown in row 3; the cost saving for the high-income countries 
would be $80.711 billion ($108.382-$27.670).  Hence, the cost saving for the high-
income countries ($80.711 billion) would be much greater than the cost to the low-
income countries ($27.093 billion).  Thus, if the high-income countries compensated the 
low-income countries 100% of their cost ($27.093 billion), the high-income countries 
would still be much better off-- $53.618 billion better off ($80.711-$27.093=$53.618)-- 
than if they had done it alone.  Note from row 3 that $53.618 billion is the world cost 
saving.  If the world saves $53.618 billion when the low-income countries participate, 
and the high-income countries compensate the low-income countries 100% of their cost, 
then the high-income countries will be $53.618 better off after low-income country 
participation and compensation than if they had done it alone.  After compensating the 
low-income countries 100% of their cost, the burden on the high-income countries (the 
sum of their own cost of reduction and their compensation to low-income countries)   8 
would be $54.763 billion ($27.670+$27.093) as shown in row 4.  Under the parameter 
values of the contribution formula used in this simulation, the per capita contribution 
from the U.S. (per capita GDP $38,027) in 2004 would be $40.  The per capita 
compensation to China (per capita GDP $5,299) would be $7.  
  The method of implementing this compensation of $27.093 billion to the 132 low-
income countries depends on whether the carbon price is established by a harmonized  
tax or by an international permit market.  If the price is established by a tax, the first step 
is to estimate the cost of emission reduction and therefore the compensation to be paid to 
each low-income country, and the second step is to assign a contribution to each high-
income country.  If the price is established by a permit market, then the initial distribution 
of permits to countries would determine each country’s compensation or contribution.  
Low-income countries would be given more permits than they would choose to use so 
that they are net sellers of permits.  Specifically in this example, low-income countries 
would be given 3.34093 billion permits so when, as indicated above, they choose to emit 
3.070 billion tons when faced with a price of $100 per permit, they would be net sellers 
of 0.27093 billion permits (3.34093-3.070); with a market price of $100 per permit, as net 
sellers they would receive $27.093 billion ($100 x 0.27093).  High-income countries 
would be given 2.86507 billion permits so when, as indicated above, they choose to emit 
3.136 billion tons when faced with a price of $100 per permit, they would be net buyers 
of 0.27093 billion permits (3.13600-2.89507); with a market price of $100 per permit, as 
net buyers they would contribute $27.093 billion.  Note that total permits (3.34093+ 
2.86507=6.207 billion) equals the target of 85% of world emissions of 7.302 billion.           9 
  This overview shows the potential of an international carbon treaty to make high-
income countries better off without harming low-income countries.  If low-income 
countries are fully compensated by high-income countries for their cost of participating, 
high-income countries are still much better off than meeting the world target by 
themselves.   
  This paper examines the consequence of alternative compensation and 
contribution formulas under an international carbon treaty.         
 
The Marginal Cost of Reducing Carbon Emissions 
 
  This study utilizes simplifying assumptions concerning the cost of emissions 
reduction.  In reality, the cost of reducing emissions includes both product distortions and 
factor-supply distortions, and the analysis of the cost of emissions reduction is complex 
both theoretically and in empirical application to a large number of diverse countries.  In 
this study we make the following simplifying assumptions: (1) in every country the 
marginal cost of emissions reduction is near zero for the first unit of emissions reduction; 
(2) the marginal cost is an increasing function of a country’s percent reduction in 
emissions; (3) the marginal cost function is the same for all countries; (4) the numerical 
values of the parameters of the marginal cost function are the same for all countries; (5) 
the combination of parameter values implies that a carbon price of $100 per ton would 
induce a 15% reduction in emissions for each country.  Obviously, these simplifications 
imply that the numerical results of the simulations in this study should therefore be     10 
viewed as only suggestive and treated with appropriate caution.  Future research should 
refine these cost assumptions.    
  We assume that marginal cost MC of reducing emission is the following function 
of the percentage reduction in a country’s emissions (R/E): 
 
(1) MC = a(R/E)
ß   (ß=1) 
 
where E is emissions in the absence of reductions and R is the emissions reduction 
relative to E so that R/E is the percentage reduction in emissions.  MC=dC/dR.  Since 
d(MC)/dR=ß(a/E
ß)R
ß-1, if ß=1 then d(MC)/dR would be constant as R increases, but if 
ß>1 then d(MC)/dR increases as R increases.  From (1), if ß=1, doubling R/E would 
double MC while if ß=2, doubling R/E would quadruple MC.    
Figure 1 shows (1) for the linear case where ß=1 and the non-linear case where 
ß=2.  The numerical values in Figure 1 will be explained below.  Here simply note that   
(1) implies that when R=0, MC=0 so that the first unit reduced has a near-zero MC in 
each country.  Recall that we assume that each country has the same MC curve.  Thus, if 
only a subset of countries undertake emissions reduction, each country in the subset will 
have a positive MC for the last unit it reduces.  But each country not in the subset, if it 
began to reduce emissions, could reduce its first unit at a near-zero MC.  In Figure 1, 
each country in the subset would initially have a positive R/E and a positive MC, but 
each country not in the subset would initially have an R/E of zero and MC of zero.  In 
Figure 1, if each country not in the subset began to raise its R/E above zero at a low MC, 
and each country in the subset in turn cut its R/E from its initial value thereby avoiding a   11 
high MC, then clearly the total cost of achieving a target total emissions reduction would 
decrease.  
It follows that the total cost of a given reduction in world emissions can always be 
decreased by broadening the subset to substitute low-marginal-cost reductions from new 
participants for high marginal-cost reductions from the original subset.    
The total cost (C) of reducing emissions R units is  
 
C = ? o





ß R/(ß+1), so  
 
(2) C = (MC)R/(ß+1)
     
 
where R is the emission reduction and MC is the marginal cost of the last emission 
reduced.  If the firm is faced with a price P per ton emitted, then it maximizes profit by 
reducing emissions until MC=P.  Substituting P for MC in (1) yields  
 
(3) P = a(R/E)
ß  
 
so in response to price P it chooses  
 
(4) R/E = (P/a)
1/ß. 
 
Based on Dinan and Rogers’ (2002) review of empirical studies for the U.S. and 
on the articles in Weyant (1999), we choose for our illustrative simulations the   12 
simplifying assumption that a P=$100 would induce an R/E=15% for each country.  We 
therefore choose a combination of (a,ß) for which (4) implies that P=$100 induces an 
R/E=15% and assume a and ß are the same for all countries.  Once again, our purpose is 
not to attempt an empirically accurate estimate which would require detailed cost 
function data on individual countries, but rather to get a very rough magnitude of the 
possible cost saving to high-income countries and to the world of getting low-income 
countries to participate.    
Figure 1 shows (1) for ß=1 (a=666.667) and ß=2 (a=4444.444).  The MC line 
with ß=1 (“the linear case”) intersects the MC curve with ß=2 (“the non-linear case”) at 
point O where P=MC=$100 and R/E=15%.  The area under the MC line or curve equals 
the total cost C of increasing the percent reduction in emissions from zero to R/E percent.  
If ß=2 rather than 1, the total cost C of increasing R/E from 0% to 15% is lower
3 but the 
total cost of increasing R/E from 15% to 30% is higher.  Therefore, if ß is 2 rather than 1, 
there are two reasons why it is particularly important to get low-income countries to 
participate.  First, the cost to the low-income countries of increasing R/E from 0% to 15% 
is less than if ß=1.  Second, the cost to the high-income countries of increasing R/E from 
15% to 30% (which they must do if they don’t get help from the low-income countries) is 
greater than if ß=1.  Note that if the high-income countries have half the total emissions
4, 
then without the help of low-income countries, they must cutback 30%; from (3), if ß=1, 
an MC=P=$200 would be required (point S) but if ß=2, an MC=P=$400 would be 
required (point Q).      
Substituting P for MC in (2) yields 
                                                 
3  Below we show that it is two-thirds. 
4 In fact the countries with per capita GDP > $12,000 have 50.52% of total emissions, and the countries 
with per capita GDP > $18,000 have 49.48% of total emissions.   13 
 
(5) C = PR/(ß+1). 
 
Substituting (4) into (5) yields    
 




A Subset of s High-Income Countries out of All n Countries  
 
If all n countries (178) are subject to price Pn, from (4) the total emission 
reduction is  
 
(7) S







If instead only subset s countries (the 46 high-income countries with per capita GDP 
greater than $12,000) are subject to price Ps, then the total emission reduction is  
 
(8) S








s Ri in (8) equal  S
n Ri in (7), Ps/Pn must be   
 





    14 
With S
s Ei =3.689 billion and S
n Ei =7.302 billion, the high-income countries have 50.52% 
of total emissions.  With ß=1, (Ps/Pn)=1/.5052=1.98, so if Pn=$100, then Ps=$198 as 
reported in the overview.  With ß=2, (Ps/Pn)=(1/.5052)
2 = 3.92, so if Pn=$100, then 
Ps=$392.  Note that without help from low-income countries, with 50.52% of total 
emissions the high-income countries must cutback 29.7% to cutback 1.095 billion so in 
Figure 1, R/E would be 29.7% and Ps would be $198 in the linear case (ß=1) and $392 in 
the non-linear case (ß=2).    
  
 
For subset s, using (5), 
 
(10) S
s Ci [Ps] = S




s Ri =1.095 billion.  With ß=1, Ps=$198 and S
s Ci [Ps]=$108.382 billion; with ß=2, 
Ps=$392 and S
s Ci [Ps]=$143.000 billion.
5  
For full set n, using (5), 
  
(11) S
n Ci [Pn]  = S




n Ri =1.095 billion and Pn=$100, for ß=1, S
n Ci [Pn]=$54.763 billion and for ß=2, 
$36.509 billion.  Because Ps is set so that S
s Ri = S
n Ri, from (10) and (11), and using (9), 
 
(12) S
s Ci [Ps] / S
n Ci[Pn]  = Ps/Pn = (S
n Ei/ S
s Ei)
ß > 1. 
 
                                                 
5 Discrepancies are due to rounding.   15 
Thus, the total cost for the subset of s countries is greater than the total cost for the full 
set of n countries.  In this example, S
s Ci [Ps] / S
n Ci[Pn]=1.98 for ß=1 and 3.92 for ß=2.  
  For each country i in subset s (the high-income countries with per capita GDP > 
$12,000), if there are only s participants facing price Ps the cost is greater than if there 
had been n participants facing price Pn.  That is, Ci[Ps]>Ci[Pn].  From (6) the cost saving 
for country i in subset s is 
 





Summing over all countries in subset s yields the total cost saving that the s 
countries would experience if the other countries participate, 
 
(14) S







sEi = 3.689 billion, ß=1, a=666.667, Ps = $198, and Pn = $100, S
s{Ci[Ps] - Ci[Pn]} 
= $80.711 billion = $108.382 billion - $27.670 billion.  These three numbers appear in 
the first column of Table 1.  With ß=2, a=4444.444, and Ps = $392, S
s{Ci[Ps] - Ci[Pn]} = 
$124.553 billion = $143.000 billion - $18.447 billion. 
Let ci =  Ci/Ni  where Ni is the population of country i so ci is the cost per capita of 
emission reduction.  Then dividing (13) by Ni yields ?ci, the cost saving per capita that 
an s country would experience if the low-income countries participate: 
 
(15) ?ci =  ci[Ps] - ci[Pn] = (Ei/Ni)[(1/a)
1/ß/(ß+1)][Ps
(ß+1)/ß - Pn
(ß+1)/ß].   16 
 
  In the following sections we present the results of several different simulations.  
Initially we assume the marginal cost function is linear, ß=1.  We continue to assume 
ß=1 until the last section entitled “A Non-Linear Marginal Cost Function” where we 
assume ß=2.   
 
An Initial Scheme: 100% Compensation, Contribution Based on Cost Saving  
 
This section considers an initial scheme for compensations and contributions that 
generates the results described in the overview in Table 1.  
Countries are ranked by GDP per capita (y).  The yi for nine large countries is 
given in Table 2 along with emissions and population data.  The Board chooses a y* that 
divides contributors from receivers.  For example, if y* is set at $12,000, then the top six 
countries in Table 2 would be contributors, and the bottom three countries would be 
receivers.   
Suppose that each low-income country with yi < y* is compensated 100% of its 
cost of emissions reduction.  For each country the cost of emissions reduction Ci is given 
by (6) so the country’s compensation Mi equals its Ci.  The number of countries receiving 
compensation is (n-s), so total compensation M=S
n-s Mi.  Note that compensation per 
capita, mi, equals Mi/Ni where Ni is its population. 
Board technicians calculate the total compensation M required for the (n-s)=132 
countries.  In the simulation, M=$27.093 billion (given in Table 1 for the 132 countries).    17 
The next step depends on whether the tax method or permit method is used to implement 
the carbon treaty. 
 
  Tax Method  
 
Under the tax method, the Board sets the contribution formula to raise just enough 
funds from the contributor countries with yi > y* to compensate the receiver countries M.  
In the initial contribution scheme, the per capita contribution xi from each contributing 
country (yi > y*) is given by:    
 
(16) xi = h(?ci) 
 
where ? ci is its cost saving given by (15).  Thus, in this scheme, a high-income country’s 
per capita contribution depends solely on the cost saving it enjoys when the low-income 
countries participate; its contribution does not depend on its per capita income.  A 
country’s total contribution Xi equals Nixi where Ni is its population.  The Board 
technicians determine the value of h that makes total contributions X=S
s Xi equal total 
compensation M=S




Under the permit method, the Board gives low-income countries a quantity of  
permits greater than 85% of their current emissions, and high-income countries a quantity   18 
of permits less than 85% of their current emissions.  Permits can then be bought and sold 
in an international permit market.  If the market price of a permit becomes $100, under 
our simplifying assumption that firms in all countries have the same carbon abatement 
cost function, firms in all countries will choose to emit 85% of their current emissions.  
Hence, each low-income country will choose to emit less than the permits it received 
from the Board and therefore will become a net seller, and each high-income country will 
choose to emit more than the permits it received from the Board and therefore will 
become a net buyer.  A low-income country’s compensation will be the market value of 
its excess permits—the dollar amount it will receive when it sells its excess permits.   
In this example, the Board would give low-income countries 3.34093 billion 
permits so when they choose to emit 3.070 billion tons (85% of their current emissions of 
3.612 billion) when faced with a price of $100 per permit, they would be net sellers of 
0.27093 billion permits (3.34093-3.070); with a market price of $100 per permit, as net 
sellers they would receive $27.093 billion ($100 x 0.27093), the desired compensation.  
The Board would give high-income countries 2.86507 billion permits so when they 
choose to emit 3.136 billion tons (85% of their current emissions of 3.689 billion) when 
faced with a price of $100 per permit, they would be net buyers of 0.27093 billion 
permits (3.13600-2.89507); with a market price of $100 per permit, as net buyers they 
would contribute $27.093 billion.   
 
  A Country’s Per Capita Burden  
   19 
  From now on, whenever we report per capita compensations for low-income 
countries or per capita contributions for high-income countries, it should be understood 
that these compensations and contributions can be implemented either by the tax method 
or the permit method. 
A high-income country’s per capita burden bi equals its per capita cost of 
emission reduction ci[Pn] plus its per capita contribution xi.  A low-income country’s per 
capita burden equals its per capita cost of emission reduction ci[Pn] minus its per capita 
compensation mi; in this initial scheme with 100% compensation, the per capita burden 
of each low-income country is zero. 
The simulation is performed for all 178 countries and the left blocks of Table 3 
show the results for nine large countries.  The per capita cost of emissions reduction for 
the U.S. would have been $161 if only the 46 high-income countries had participated, but 
is only $41 if all 178 countries participate.  For the six contributing countries in the table, 
the per capita contribution x ranges from $40 for the U.S. to $13 for France.  For each of 
the three receiving countries in the table, with 100% compensation the per capita 
compensation m equals its cost of emissions reduction c[Pn] which ranges from $24 for 
Russia to $2 for India.  For the six contributing countries, the per capita burden ranges 
from $81 for the U.S. ($41+$40) to $27 for France ($13+$13).  For the three receiving 
countries, with 100% compensation the per capita burden is $0.  The U.S. contributes 
44% of the total contributions (Xi as a % of X is 44%) and China receives 36% of the 
total compensation (Mi as a % of M is 36%).  Because of (16), xi is the same percent of 
?ci for all contributing countries.  To raise the required revenue from contributors, the 
Board technicians find that h must be set at 34%, so xi  as a percent of ?ci equals 34% for   20 
all contributing countries.  Thus, each high-income country contributes 34% of its cost 
saving that results from having the low-income countries participate.                 
 
Phasing Down the Compensation Percentage 
 
  The problem with the sharp dichotomy (either 100% compensation or no 
compensation) is the widely disparate treatment of two countries, one with a yi just below 
y*, the other with a yi just above y*.  Consider Uruguay that has a per capita income of 
$12,108.  If its per capita income were just $109 less, it would receive 100% 
compensation, but now it receives none.  It would seem fairer to modify the 
compensation formula to include a smooth phase-down of the percent of compensation.  
In this section, we therefore consider 100% compensation for yi < y = $6,000 and a 
smooth phase-down of the percentage as yi increases from $6,000 to $12,000.    
Under the formula in this section, the percent compensation pi phases down 
linearly as yi rises from y to y*; specifically, pi = (y* - yi)/(y* - y) so if yi = y then pi = 
100% and if yi = y*, pi = 0%.  Compensation for country i, Mi, is given by Mi = piCi.  The 
per capita contribution mi is Mi/Ni = piCi/Ni  and total compensation M for all receiving 
countries (yi < y*) is M = S
n-s piCi. 
With this phase-down formula, the simulation is performed for all 178 countries 
and the right blocks of Table 3 show the results for nine large countries.  With less than 
100% compensation for countries with per capita income between $6,000 and $12,000, 
total compensation, $21.069 billion, is now less than the total cost of emissions reduction   21 
for the compensated countries, $27.093 billion, so total compensation is 78% of total cost 
for the compensated countries.   
For the six contributing countries in the table, the per capita contribution x now 
ranges from $31 (instead of $40) for the U.S. to $10 (instead of $13) for France.  For 
each of the three receiving countries in the table, the per capita compensation now ranges 
from $10 for Russia (instead of $24) to $2 for India (same as before) because Russia (per 
capita income $9,627) now receives 40% (instead of 100%) compensation while India 
(per capita income $2,849) continues to receive 100% compensation.  China (per capita 
income $5,299) also continues to receive 100% compensation.  For the six contributing 
countries, the per capita burden now ranges from $72 for the U.S. ($41+$31) to $24 for 
France ($13+$10).  India and China continue to have zero burden due to 100% 
compensation, but Russia now has a per capita burden of $15 due to only 40% 
compensation.  The U.S. still contributes 44% of the total contributions (Xi as a % of X is 
44%) but China now receives 46% (instead of 36%) of the total compensation (Mi as a % 
of M is 46%).  Because of (16), xi is the same percent of ?ci for all contributing countries.  
To raise the required revenue from contributors, the Board technicians find that h must 
now be set at 26%, so xi  as a percent of ?ci equals 26% for all contributing countries 
(instead of 34% when all countries below $12,000 receive 100% compensation).  Thus, 
each high-income country contributes 26% of its cost saving resulting from having the 
low-income countries participate.                 
 
A Formula with Contribution Based on Income 
   22 
In the preceding two sections, the contribution of each high-income country with 
yi > y* = $12,000 depends, according to (16), solely on its cost saving ?c i = ci[Ps] - 
ci[Pn]—each country’s per capita contribution was the same percentage of its ?c i (34% in 
the left block, 26% in the right block).   In this section we consider an expanded 
contribution formula.   We retain 100% compensation for yi less than $6,000 and the 
same linear phase down for countries with yi between $6,000 and $12,000.  Total 
compensation remains the same as in the preceding section ($21.069 billion)  
  We now consider contribution formula (17) in which each country’s contribution 
varies with its per capita income so      
 




where ? yi =  yi – y*.  Note that formula (17) reduces to formula (16) in the special case 
where v = 0 and w = 1.  We limit our tables and discussion to values for v of 1, 2, and 
values for w of 1 and 0.   If w = 0, then xi is based solely on ? yi.  A v of 1 yields a 
“proportional” contribution formula while a v of 2 yields a “progressive” contribution 
formula.  Note that setting v=0.5 (not shown in the table) would yield a “regressive” 
contribution formula which would place less burden than a proportional formula (v=1) on 
the highest income countries (such as the U.S.).  Once again, each year the Board sets the 
numerical value for h that Board technicians estimate will raise an amount M of total 
funds from the contributor countries equal to the total funds X promised to receiver 
countries.  Note that the compensation received by each low-income country is the same 
as in the preceding section because y* is still $12,000 and y is still $6,000.  Recall from   23 
Table 2 that five of the six contributor countries each have a per capita GDP near $27,000 
to $28,000 while the sixth—the U.S.-- has a per capita income near $38,000.  
With contribution formula (17), the simulation is performed for all 178 countries 
and the results are given in the four blocks of Table 4.  We will compare results in Table 
4 to the right block of Table 3 which has the same compensations to low-income 
countries (yi < $12,000) but differs in the contributions of high-income countries (yi > 
$12,000). 
In the top left block of Table 4, w is 1 (as in Table 3) but now ?y i also affects xi 
and in particular v = 1 (“proportional”).  We compare the top left block in Table 4 to the 
top right block of Table 3.  For the six contributing countries, the per capita contribution 
x now ranges from $42 (instead of $31) for the U.S. to $8 (instead of $10) for France, and 
the per capita burden now ranges from $83 for the U.S. (instead $72) to $21 for France 
(instead of $24).  The U.S. now contributes 58% of the total contributions (instead of 
44%).  Because of (17), xi is no longer the same percent of ? ci for all contributing 
countries.  In the top blocks of Table 4 w is 1 as in Table 3, but in the bottom blocks w is 
0 in contrast to Table 3. 
Shifting from the top left block to the top right block of Table 4, w is still 1 but 
now v = 2 (“progressive”).  We compare this top right block in Table 4 where v = 2 
(“progressive) to the top left block in Table 4 where v = 1 (proportional).  For the six 
contributing countries, the per capita contribution x now ranges from $50 (instead of $42) 
for the U.S. to $5 (instead of $8)  for France, and the per capita burden now ranges from 
$91 for the U.S. (instead $83) to $19 (instead of $21) for France.  The U.S. now 
contributes 70% (instead of 58%) of the total contributions.     24 
Suppose instead the Treaty Board sets w = 0 so that in (17) the per capita 
contribution depends only on ?y i and not on ?c i.  In the bottom left block, v = 1 
(“proportional”).  We compare the bottom left block and the top left block which have the 
same v = 1 but differ in w.  For the six contributing countries, the per capita contribution 
x now ranges from $31 (instead of $42) for the U.S. to $18 (instead of $8) for France, and 
the per capita burden now ranges from $72 (instead $83) for the U.S. to $31 (instead of 
$21) for France.  The U.S. now contributes 43% (instead of 58%) of the total 
contributions                     
In the bottom right block, v=2 (“progressive”).  We compare the bottom right 
block (v = 2) and the bottom left block (v = 1).  For the six contributing countries, the per 
capita contribution x now ranges from $40 (instead of $31) for the U.S. to $13 (instead of 
$18)  for France, and the per capita burden now ranges from $81 (instead $72) for the 
U.S. to $27 (instead of $31) for France.  The U.S. now contributes 56% (instead of 43%) 
of the total contributions. 
  Thus, the U.S. contribution is largest and France’s contribution smallest when the 
formula is progressive (v=2 instead of 1) and when cost saving is also used in the formula 
(w=1 instead of 0) because the U.S. is a very high-income country and a very high cost-
saving country (because its very high emissions makes it very costly to reduce emissions 
without help) while France is a moderately high-income country and a moderately cost-
saving country (because its moderate emissions makes it only moderately costly to reduce 
emissions without help).       
 
More Compensated Countries and Less Contributing Countries    25 
 
What happens if y* is set at $18,000 instead of $12,000 and y is set at $9,000 
instead of $6,000?  A subset of 35 countries have yi > $18,000 (compared with 46 
countries that have yi > $12,000), so now only 35 (instead of 46) countries are 
contributors and 143 (instead of 132) countries are receivers who get compensated.  With 
y = $9,000 instead of $6,000, more countries receive full compensation for the cost of 
their emission reduction.  The 143 countries receive a total compensation M of $26.345 
billion (by contrast, the 132 countries received a total compensation M of $21.069 
billion).  With the phase-down from 100% compensation beginning at $9,000 instead of 
$6,000, Russia (yi = $9,627) with a per capita cost of $24 gets much more fully 
compensated-- $23 instead of $10-- for an increase in total compensation of $1.843 
billion (from $1.363 billion to $3.206 billion).  Most of the increase in compensation 
goes to countries in the $9,000 to $12,000 range that get more fully compensated.
6     
We compare Table 5 where y*=$18,000 and y=$9,000 to Table 4 where 
y*=$12,000 and y=$6,000.  Initially we focus on the top left block of each table (where 
v=1 and w=1).  For these six contributors, the five with per capita income near $27,000 to 
$28,000 incur a small increase in their per capita contribution (for example, Germany’s 
increases from $13 to $15) while the sixth—the U.S.—with a per capita income near 
$38,000 incurs a large increase (from $42 to $58); note that the U.S.’s share of total 
contributions is 64% (instead of 58%).  The result is similar in the bottom left block (with 
                                                 
6 Although raising y* from $12,000 to $18,000 and y from $6,000 to $9,000 causes a substantial increase in 
total compensation (from $21.069 billion to $26.345 billion), perhaps surprisingly it causes only a small 
increase in the total cost of emissions reduction of all compensated countries (from $27.093 billion to 
$27.826 billion) because the countries with yi between $12,000 and $18,000—the “newly compensated”— 
have a small total cost of emission reduction.  As a consequence, this increase in y* and y raises the percent 
of total cost that is compensated for countries with yi below y* from 78% ($21.069/$27.093) to 95% 
($26.345/$27.826).   26 
v still 1, but w=0).  However, in the right blocks where v=2 (progressive), the U.S. incurs 
an even larger increase, but the other five incur a small decrease; note that in the top right 
block the U.S. share of total contributions is 77% (instead of 70%).
7 
 
A Non-Linear Marginal Cost Function (ß=2)  
 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 assume that ß=1 in equation (1) so that marginal cost MC is a 
linear function of the percent reduction in emissions (R/E).  Suppose instead that ß=2 so 
that the relationship between MC and (R/E) is non-linear as shown in Figure 1.  Recall 
that we adjust a when ß changes so that a price P of $100 induces an R/E of 15%.  
With ß=2, if high-income countries get no help from low-income countries, their 
cost of emissions reduction is now much higher-- $143.000 billion (as noted above in our 
comment on equation (10)) instead of $108.382—and a price of $392 instead of $198 
would be required to induce the target reduction in world emissions.  
In Figure 1, compare the cost of increasing R/E from 0% to 15% for ß=1 (the 
straight line) and ß=2 (the curve).  The line and the curve intersect at P=$100, R/E=15%.  
In equation (5), C=PR/(ß+1), and at the intersection point, P and R are the same for the 
line and the curve so that for any two values of ß (ß1 and ß2), C[ß2]/C[ß1] = (ß1+1)/(ß2+1); 
for ß1=1 and ß2=2, the cost ratio is 2/3.  Thus, if ß is 2 (curve) instead of 1 (line), the cost 
of increasing R/E from 0% to 15% is only two-thirds as great for any country.  Since 
according to the formula a low-income country must be compensated pi percent of its 
participation cost, the amount of compensation for each country would be only two-thirds 
as great if ß=2 instead of 1.  The burden, therefore, for each low-income country (its cost 
                                                 
7 There is one country for which x i generated by (17) exceeds ?ci  for v=2; in this case we set xi = ?ci.    27 
of increasing its R/E from 0% to 15% minus its compensation) is also only two-thirds as 
great.  Note that total compensation with ß=2 would be $14.046 billion which is two-
thirds of the total compensation of $21.069 billion with ß=1.   
With total compensation only two-thirds as great, then the required contribution 
from each high-income country is only two-thirds as great.  Moreover, the cost for each 
high-income country of increasing R/E from 0% to 15% (when all countries participate) 
is also only two-thirds as great with ß=2 instead of 1.  Thus, the burden for each high-
income country (its cost of increasing its R/E from 0% to 15% plus its contribution) is 
only two-thirds as great.          
Thus, for every country, high or low-income, with ß=2 its per capita cost of its 
15% emission reduction, its per capita contribution or compensation, and hence its per 
capita burden, are only two-thirds than if ß were 1.  Clearly, the empirical value of ß (the 
degree of non-linearity of the marginal cost function) is important.  
Table 6 shows the results for ß=2 for y*=$12,000 and y=$6,000 so it is useful to 
compare Table 6 with Table 4.   
In each block for the contributing countries, each numerical value in the three per-
capita columns c[Pn], x, and b in Table 6 is two-thirds of its corresponding value in Table 
4 whereas each numerical value in the Xi % column in Table 6 is the same as its 
corresponding value in Table 4.  Even though each value of x in Table 6 is two-thirds of 
its corresponding value in Table 4, x as a % of ?c in Table 6 is considerably lower than 
two-thirds of its corresponding value in Table 4.  This is because each value of ?c, the 
difference between c[Ps] and c[Pn], in Table 6 is considerably higher than its   28 
corresponding value in Table 4.  For example, for the U.S. in Table 6, ?c=$213-$27= 
$186 whereas in Table 4 ?c=$161-$41=$120. 
In the bottom block for the receiving countries, each numerical value in the three 
per-capita columns c[Pn], m, and b in Table 6 is two-thirds of its corresponding value in 
Table 4 whereas each numerical value in the Mi % column in Table 6 is the same as its 




The simulations in this paper using 2004 data on carbon emissions and per capita 
GDP from 178 countries suggest that high-income countries might be much better off 
compensating low-income countries to help reduce carbon emissions rather than reducing 
carbon emissions without their help.  If emissions are reduced through a harmonized 
carbon tax, compensation is implemented directly through a formula that prescribes the 
compensation to each low-income country and the contribution from each high-income 
country.  If emissions are reduced through marketable permits, compensation and 
contributions would be implemented indirectly by the distribution of permits to 
countries—low-income countries would be given more permits than they would choose 
to use so they would be net sellers of permits; high-income countries would be given less 
permits than they would choose to use so they would be net buyers of permits.  The 
numerical results of this study should be interpreted with caution because they are based 
on several simplifying assumptions concerning abatement cost functions.  We performed 
several simulations using alternative compensation and contribution formulas.    29 
In our initial simulation, if the 46 countries with per capita GDP above $12,000 
want to reduce world emissions by 1.095 billion metric tons (15%) in 2004, we calculated 
that the total cost of their emissions reduction if they do it without help would be $108 
billion.  But if they get optimal help from the 132 low-income countries, the total cost of 
reducing world emissions 1.095 billion would be only $55 billion-- $27 billion for the 
low-income countries and $28 billion for the high-income countries-- so the world cost 
saving would be $53 billion and the cost saving for the high-income countries would be 
$80 billion.  Thus, if the high-income countries compensated the low-income countries 
100% of their cost ($27 billion), the high-income countries would still be $54 billion 
better off than if they had done it alone.  Under the formula used in this initial simulation, 
China’s per capita compensation would be $7 and the U.S.’s per capita contribution 
would be $40. 
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Table 1:  100% Compensation (billions of dollars) 
 







Cost When 46 Participate 
 
$108.382  $0  $108.382 
Cost When 178 Participate 
 
$27.670  $27.093  $54.763 
Cost Saving 
 
$80.711  -$27.093  $53.618 
Burden After 100% Compensation                                $54.763  $0  $54.763 
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Table 2:  Data for Selected Countries 
 




metric tons of 
carbon (E/N) 
Total Emissions 
in billions of 




U. S.  $38,027  5.487  1.612  0.294 
Japan  $28,273  2.695  0.344  0.128 
Germany  $28,014  2.851  0.235  0.082 
U. K.  $27,777  2.637  0.158  0.060 
Italy  $27,476  2.297  0.132  0.058 
France  $27,075  1.792  0.111  0.062 
Russia  $9,627  3.228  0.460  0.142 
China  $5,299  0.984  1.284  1.305 
India  $2,849  0.279  0.304  1.087   36 
 
Table 3:  Alternative Treaty-Board Compensation Schemes 
Dollar amounts in table are per capita 
 
Per Capita Contributions (x) Dependent on Per Capita Cost Saving but Independent of Per 
Capita Income  
 


































US  $161  $41  $40  $81  44%  34%  $31  $72  44%  26% 
Ja  $79  $20  $20  $40  9%  34%  $15  $36  9%  26% 
Ge  $84  $21  $21  $42  6%  34%  $16  $38  6%  26% 
UK  $77  $20  $19  $39  4%  34%  $15  $35  4%  26% 
It  $67  $17  $17  $34  4%  34%  $13  $30  4%  26% 
Fr  $53  $13  $13  $27  3%  34%  $10  $24  3%  26%   
 
Per Capita Compensation (m) for Countries with Largest Total Compensation 
 


































            Russia  $24  $24  $0  13%  $24  $10  $15  6% 
  $7  $7  $0  36%  $7  $7  $0  46% 
 
      China 
          India  $2  $2  $0  8%  $2  $2  $0  11% 
 
Key: Ja is Japan, Ge is Germany, Fr is France, and It is Italy   37 
 
Table 4:  Alternative Treaty-Board Compensation Schemes 
y*=$12,000, y=$6,000 
Dollar amounts in table are per capita 
 
Per Capita Contributions (x) Dependent on Per Capita Income and Per Capita Cost Saving 
(w=1) 
 
      Proportional v=1  Progressive v=2 






























US  $161  $41  $42  $83  58%  35%  $50  $91  70%  42% 
Ja  $79  $20  $13  $33  8%  22%  $10  $30  6%  16% 
Ge  $84  $21  $13  $35  5%  22%  $10  $31  4%  16% 
UK  $77  $20  $12  $32  3%  21%  $9  $29  3%  15% 
It  $67  $17  $10  $28  3%  21%  $7  $25  2%  15% 
Fr  $53  $13  $8  $21  2%  20%  $5  $19  2%  14%   
 
Per Capita Contributions (x) Dependent on Per Capita Income but Independent of Cost 
Saving (w=0) 
 
      Proportional v=1  Progressive v=2 






























US  $161  $41  $31  $72  43%  26%  $40  $81  56%  33% 
Ja  $79  $20  $19  $40  12%  33%  $16  $36  9%  26% 
Ge  $84  $21  $19  $40  7%  31%  $15  $37  6%  25% 
UK  $77  $20  $19  $38  5%  32%  $15  $34  4%  25% 
It  $67  $17  $18  $36  5%  37%  $14  $31  4%  28% 
Fr  $53  $13  $18  $31  5%  46%  $13  $27  4%  34% 
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Table 5:  Alternative Treaty-Board Compensation Schemes 
y*=$18,000, y=$9,000 
Dollar amounts in table are per capita 
 
Per Capita Contributions (x) Dependent on Per Capita Income and Per Capita Cost Saving 
(w=1) 
 
      Proportional v=1  Progressive v=2 






























US  $170  $41  $58  $99  64%  45%  $69  $110  77%  54% 
Ja  $84  $20  $15  $35  7%  23%  $9  $29  4%  14% 
Ge  $88  $21  $15  $37  5%  23%  $9  $31  3%  14% 
UK  $82  $20  $14  $33  3%  22%  $8  $28  2%  13% 
It  $71  $17  $11  $29  2%  21%  $7  $24  1%  12% 
Fr  $56  $13  $9  $22  2%  20%  $5  $18  1%  11%   
 
Per Capita Contributions (x) Dependent on Per Capita Income but Independent of Cost 
Saving (w=0) 
 
      Proportional v=1  Progressive v=2 






























US  $170  $41  $45  $86  50%  35%  $59  $100  66%  46% 
Ja  $84  $20  $23  $43  11%  36%  $15  $36  7%  24% 
Ge  $88  $21  $22  $44  7%  34%  $15  $36  5%  22% 
UK  $82  $20  $22  $42  5%  35%  $14  $34  3%  23% 
It  $71  $17  $21  $38  5%  39%  $13  $30  3%  24% 
Fr  $56  $13  $20  $34  5%  48%  $12  $26  3%  29% 
 
Per Capita Compensation (m) for Countries with Largest Total Compensation 
 
  c[Pn]  m  b  Mi as % of M   
Russia  $24  $23  $2  6%   
China  $7  $7  $0  46%   
India  $2  $2  $0  11%   
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Table 6:  Alternative Treaty-Board Compensation Schemes 
y*=$12,000, y=$6,000 
Non-Linear Marginal Cost (ß=2) 
Dollar amounts in table are per capita 
 
Per Capita Contributions (x) Dependent on Per Capita Income and Per Capita Cost Saving 
(w=1) 
 
      Proportional v=1  Progressive v=2 






























US  $213  $27  $28  $55  58%  15%  $33  $61  70%  18% 
Ja  $104  $13  $9  $22  8%  9%  $6  $20  6%  7% 
Ge  $111  $14  $9  $23  5%  9%  $7  $21  4%  7% 
UK  $102  $13  $8  $21  3%  9%  $6  $19  3%  7% 
It  $89  $11  $7  $19  3%  9%  $5  $16  2%  6% 
Fr  $69  $9  $5  $14  2%  9%  $4  $13  2%  6%   
 
Per Capita Contributions (x) Dependent on Per Capita Income but Independent of Cost 
Saving (w=0) 
 
      Proportional v=1  Progressive v=2 






























US  $213  $27  $21  $48  43%  11%  $27  $54  56%  14% 
Ja  $104  $13  $13  $26  12%  14%  $10  $24  9%  11% 
Ge  $111  $14  $13  $27  7%  13%  $10  $24  6%  11% 
UK  $102  $13  $12  $26  5%  14%  $10  $23  4%  11% 
It  $89  $11  $12  $24  5%  16%  $9  $21  4%  12% 
Fr  $69  $9  $12  $21  5%  17%  $9  $18  4%  15% 
 
Per Capita Compensation (m) for Countries with Largest Total Compensation 
 
  c[Pn]  m  b  Mi as % of M   
Russia  $16  $6  $10  6%   
China  $5  $5  $0  46%   
India  $1  $1  $0  11%   
 
                                             